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Due to the circumstances of the loss of HMSWarrior and HMS Sparrowhawk in 1916, in which subsequent to disablement both
had drifted and been towed unknown distances from the Jutland battleﬁeld, they were not located in the 2015 Jutland survey.
In August 2016 both ships were located and HMSWarrior was revealed to be a pristine warship wreck, the only example in this
condition of the 25 ships sunk in the battle. HMS Sparrowhawk had a similar pattern of disturbance as seven of the other Battle
of Jutland destroyer wrecks. The survey of these wrecks draws to a conclusion a long period of discovery at Jutland and raises
questions as to how these important cultural artefacts should be treated in the future.
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The Battle of Jutland, fought 31 May to 1 June1916, saw the two most powerful battle ﬂeetsin the world clash off western Denmark. More
skirmish than battleﬂeet action, the German High Seas
Fleet, having unintentionally encountered the entire
British Grand Fleet, slipped into the mists of the North
Sea and escaped. But in the 16 hours in which this
drama unfolded, 25 ships were sunk and 8500 lost their
lives. The Grand Fleet lost 14 of the ships and around
6000 of the sailors killed. Two of the 14 losses are the
subject of this article.
In April 2015 the author partnered with the Danish
Sea War Museum Jutland to locate and survey with
swath bathymetry and ROV the shipwrecks sunk in
the Battle of Jutland 1916. Of the 25 ships sunk, 22
were located and surveyed (McCartney, 2016). In 2016
two further expeditions into the North Sea followed,
which were in part aimed at ﬁnding the last three
missing shipwrecks. InMarch 2016, SMSV4was found
along with the stern portion of HMS Indefatigable
(McCartney, 2017a). Finally, inAugust 2016, the survey
pinpointed the locations of HMS Warrior and HMS
Sparrowhawk.
The losses of both of these last two ships share
common features in that they occurred not in battle,
but in the hours afterwards as their battle-damaged
remains ﬁnally succumbed to the sea, with the survivors
being rescued by passing allied warships returning to
Britain. It was known that both vessels were disabled
in battle, drifted without power, and were then towed
an unknown distance before being scuttled (Harper,
1927). This meant that they would probably be the
most time-consuming to locate because it was thought
that they would lie outside of the main battleﬁeld area.
With the mission of surveying as many of the Jutland
shipwrecks as possible in the time allowed in 2015 they
had consequently been of low priority. However, the
results of the 2015 survey once analysed revealed that
the chronology of the Battle of Jutland produced by
the Royal Navy’s navigation school in 1919, known as
the Harper Record (Harper, 1927), represented a very
accurate spatial depiction of the battle (McCartney,
2016: 243–247). This was encouraging because it gave
positions for the losses of both the missing ships, giving
us a good starting position for both searches.
As it turned out, the position given for HMS
Warrior’s loss was the most inaccurate in the entire
Harper Record by a very considerable margin.
The wreck lies 25 miles from the Harper position.
Comparison of the Jutland wreck-sites with Harper’s
estimated positions showed the average discrepancy
to be 3.5 nautical miles (McCartney, 2016: 244).
Sparrowhawk lies six miles from the Harper position
(Fig. 1). As described here, an additional destroyer
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Figure 1. The locations of the wrecks of HMS Warrior and HMS Sparrowhawk shown in relation to the other wrecks of the
Battle of Jutland and the positions given in the Harper Record. ‘Site B’ wreck, possibly an S138-class German torpedo boat, is
marked with a red cross (Innes McCartney).
wreck was located to the east of Harper’s position
for Sparrowhawk. This also had to be eliminated
as a candidate for Sparrowhawk during the survey
work.
HMSWarrior
The armoured cruiser HMS Warrior was the named
ship of its class of four, Warrior, Achilles, Cochrane,
andNatal. Theywere the penultimate class of armoured
cruisers built by Britain but by the time of the Battle of
Jutland, little more than 10 years after HMS Warrior
was launched, it was an obsolete ship. The primary
reason for this was the development of the dreadnought
version of the armoured cruiser; the ﬁrst battlecruiser,
HMS Invincible, was launched in 1907, just two years
afterWarrior, and was also lost at Jutland.
TheWarrior class displaced 13,767 tonnes, was 154m
long and 22m wide (Fig. 2). Their main armament was
made up of guns mounted in single turrets, 6 × 9.2-
inch and 4× 7.5-inch. The 9.2-inch guns were mounted
forward and aft and in the pairs of turrets mounted
nearest to the foremast and mainmast. These turrets
slightly overhung the line of the upper deck, a feature
that helped in conﬁrming the ship’s identity.
The 7.5-inch turrets were mounted two a side in
the centre of the ship. HMS Warrior represented the
apogee of the armoured cruiser concept, particularly in
the arrangement of all of the main guns on the upper
deck enabling them to be ﬁred in any sea state. The
ships of this class were renowned for being excellent
sea boats and stable gun platforms, leading to them
being regarded as the best cruisers Britain had ever built
(Parkes, 1966: 441–447).
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Figure 2. HMS Warrior in the North Sea, date unknown. The guns are traversed as if on ﬁring exercise (Richard Osborne
Collection, World Ship Society).
The sinking of HMSWarrior
Although past their prime, armoured cruisers were
employed in two squadrons by the Grand Fleet in a
scouting role during the Battle of Jutland. This role
was originally planned to have been carried out by the
battlecruisers, but they had been formed into a separate
unit, the Battle Cruiser Fleet operating independently
out of Rosyth. So the old armoured cruisers were used
to fulﬁl the battlecruiser’s role (McCartney, 2016: 89).
The all-armoured First Cruiser Squadron (1CS) was
made up of HMS Defence (Rear Admiral Sir Robert
Arbuthnot commanding), HMS Warrior, HMS Duke
of Edinburgh, and HMS Black Prince. Only Duke of
Edinburgh survived the battle. During the outset of the
brief ﬂeet action at the height of the battle, the 1CS
came fatally close to the German battle line. It seems
that Arbuthnot attempted to ﬁnish off the damaged
German light cruiser SMS Wiesbaden. In doing so,
1CS passed into the space between the two battle ﬂeets
and unwittingly became a target for the van of the
German Fleet, receiving damage it was never designed
to withstand. HMS Defence was peremptorily sunk
with all hands (McCartney, 2012: 56–58).
At the time of Defence’s loss, only Warrior was
directly in line astern, as the other two ships had been
sailing as detached wings of the battle ﬂeet. It seems at
least Duke of Edinburgh was attempting to rejoin the
line at this time and Black Prince was further behind.
Under ﬁre initially from the German battlecruisers at
the head of the German ﬂeet and then by the van of
the battleﬂeet itself, Defence exploded at around 18:19.
By this time,Warrior had already been fatally damaged
and turned away north-west to seek relief behind the
British line (Harper, 1927: 38).
According to the reports ﬁled by Warrior’s
commanding officer, Capt. V.B. Molteno, as soon
as Warrior turned away it was noticed that the ship
was rapidly losing speed. Within ten minutes news was
received on the bridge that both engine rooms were
disabled. But as they ﬁlled with seawater, the ship’s
propellers kept revolving and took Warrior out of
danger. Turning for base, the small seaplane carrier
HMS Engadine was spotted and signalled to stand
by. A photograph shows HMS Warrior as seen from
Engadine at this time (Fig. 3).
By 20:00 it was clear that seawater was almost ﬁlling
both engine rooms and that Warrior would soon come
to a stop, so was taken in tow by Engadine. Towing
continued all night, but by 07:45 it was clear that despite
heroic efforts, Warrior was going to sink and had to
be evacuated. The crew was transferred to Engadine
and Warrior was abandoned. In the hope that the
ship might later be towed by a larger vessel in calmer
seas, all water-tight doors were shut and the ship was
left adrift (Admiralty, 1920: 289–295). Capt. Molteno’s
post action report lists 67 crew killed and one missing.
They went down with the ship (TNA ADM 137/302).
Discovery and survey
That Warrior had been cast adrift meant that any
calculation as to where it actually sank could only be
roughly estimated. So despite the fact that bothWarrior
and Engadine ﬁxed the position where the ship was
abandoned, it was not likely that it would be found
nearby. The weather at the time of abandonment is
known to have been blowing from the south-west at
around force 5–6 (Meteorological Office, 1916: 153
and TNA ADM 137/302: 398). So it seemed that the
wreck may possibly be found further east than the
abandonment point. This proved to be the case.
After several other wrecks had been surveyed and
ruled out, the wreck of HMSWarriorwas located in the
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Figure 3. The last-known photo of HMS Warrior taken at
around 18:40 on 31 May 1916 when HMS Engadine came to
her aid (National Museum of the Royal Navy).
Figure 4. The digital terrain model of HMS Warrior as
located on multibeam in the evening of 24 August 2016.
The wreck appeared to be completely upside-down (Innes
McCartney/Sea War Museum Jutland).
late evening of 24 August 2016 at a position recorded in
Danish records held by Sea War Museum Jutland as a
net snag (Fig. 4). The wreck points to the south-east
and was measured at the correct length and width for
HMS Warrior. On the digital terrain model (DTM) it
looked as if the wreck was completely upside-down and
therefore few of the readily identiﬁable features could be
seen. Inspection by ROV was required to ascertain for
certain that the wreck was HMS Warrior, but also to
attempt to discern the manner of its sinking. The ROV
was deployed at 23:00 and aside from theROV’s lighting
the wreck was in complete darkness throughout the
inspection, explaining the dark character of the images.
The ROV passed from the northerly end of the wreck
down the north side and around the bow. In the stern
area the rudder was seen to have been ﬂattened into a
near horizontal position (Fig. 5A). Both propellers were
present and one is visible in Figure 5B. Both propeller
shafts and the rudder were observed to have been bent
so that they lay with a bias to the starboard side of
the wreck. The ROV then moved to the level of the
upper deck and the curved overhanging structure of
the after starboard side 9.2-inch gun barbette could be
seen (Fig. 5C). The turret itself is mainly buried and
there is no clearance under the wreck. The armoured
wall of this turret was seen to have split along a join
in the armoured plate (Fig. 5D), probably because it is
one of the structures supporting the entire weight of the
ship. In the foreground of Figure 5D is a section of the
mainmast, which was observed to be running out from
under the body of the wreck at this point.
The ROV continued along the starboard side of
the ship at the seabed level (Fig. 6). The remains
of a pinnace with its distinctive propeller was seen
just forward of the visible portion of the mainmast
(Fig. 6A). The underside of the overhanging barbette
(now inverted) of the forward of the 9.2-inch gun turret
on that side of the ship was visible (Fig. 6B). Under
it, a portion of the foremast could be seen poking out
(Fig. 6C). This has folded back on itself and the top is
buried under the wreck. The foremast passes out from
under the wreck just forward of the turret (Fig. 6D). It
must have fallen over the gun barrel as the ship sunk.
The bow area of the wreck was observed to be the
most degraded (Fig. 7). The exposed frames at the
forward end of the ship, approximately in line with
‘A’ turret, were recorded (Fig. 7A) beyond the forward
end of the armoured citadel, at a point where at the
upper-deck level no armour was ﬁtted (Parkes, 1966:
443). Here, the thinner metal of the hull has entirely
corroded, leaving a porthole to lie on the underside of
the upper deck. Further forward, more portholes could
be seen lying on the seabed and the frames themselves
have buckled (Fig. 7B). The probable reason for this
is visible in Figure 7C, as it is the sheer weight of
the anchor, its hawse, and cables that is forcing this
area downwards. The distinctive outer walkway of these
armoured cruisers was also seen (Fig. 7D). The area
shown is on the port side of the wreck, in line with ‘A’
turret.
Concluding remarks
The wreck lies at a general depth of 80m but the
scouring around it goes down to beyond 82m (Fig. 8).
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Figure 5. ROV images of the stern and after port side of the wreck of HMS Warrior (Innes McCartney/Sea War Museum
Jutland).
Figure 6. ROV images of the central portion of the port side of the wreck of HMSWarrior (InnesMcCartney/SeaWarMuseum
Jutland).
The wreck is almost entirely upside-down. Its SE/NW
orientation is consistent with a vessel that had drifted
beam on to the prevailing weather as reported at the
time. The noticeable holes in the DTM in line with the
engine roomwere not examined byROV. Theymay well
turn out to be the exit holes of the rounds which sunk
the ship. This cannot be known for certain until the
wreck is examined again in the future.
The survey of the wreck shows that it must have sunk
stern ﬁrst. It was last seen heavily down by the stern.
It seems probable that the stern may have temporarily
embedded itself in the seabed when the ship hit bottom.
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Figure 7. ROV images of the fore section of the wreck of HMSWarrior (Innes McCartney/Sea War Museum Jutland).
Figure 8. How features observed on the wreck of HMS Warrior are located as shown on a multibeam rendering of the wreck
(Innes McCartney/Sea War Museum Jutland).
Being nearly twice as long as the sea is deep its bows
would have risen into the air and the weight of the
upper works would have twisted it upside-down as it
descended to the bottom. It must have been inverted
when it settled to account for the masts being crushed
underneath it, as they are. This also explains how the
rudderwas twisted through 90 degrees and the propeller
shafts were bent.
A very surprising feature is the distance the wreck
was found from the Harper position (as described
earlier). Moreover, the position given by Harper for
where the ship sank is not the same as that reported
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by Capt. Molteno (Admiralty, 1920: 293). In fact,
Molteno gave two different positions. The ﬁrst was the
point recorded for the abandonment as agreed by both
Warrior and Engadine. This was subsequently amended
to 15 miles further north (magnetic) (Admiralty, 1920:
293), which by the variation in the area in 1916
is 13.25 degrees west of due North (Gordon, 1996:
605). Interestingly, both of these positions plot an
implausibly long 60 nautical miles west of the wreck.
Clearly something isn’t quite right.
Harper may have noticed in 1919 that some element
of Molteno’s reckoning was odd. Because when the
Harper Record was completed, the sinking position
given is closer to where Warrior actually lies, but still
over 25 miles from the wreck (Harper, 1927: 110). He
would have known from the reports from Warrior and
Engadine that the slowly settling ship was heavily down
by the stern with decks awash and was considered likely
to survive less than three hours (Admiralty, 1920: 293
and TNA ADM 137/302: 398). Under such conditions
he must have concluded that Warrior would not have
drifted far before foundering. So why did he move the
Molteno position further east by 35 miles?
The answermay lie in the fact that the speedEngadine
measured while towingWarrior seems too fast. Initially
it wasmeasured at 8.2 knots, then bymorning at 6 knots
(Admiralty, 1920: 292). It seems this may have been
overly optimistic. Certainly a slower progress under tow
would bring the Molteno position nearer to the wreck-
site. But it also opens the possibility that Warrior may
have drifted unmanned for several more hours than
previously thought.
Another cruiser, albeit signiﬁcantly smaller, was lost
on 1 June 1916 while immobile and drifting. SMS
Wiesbaden—coincidentally the shipWarrior was trying
to dispatch when it was fatally holed—is known to
have drifted for several hours at a speed of one knot
(McCartney, 2016: 132–133). A similar rate of progress
for HMS Warrior would mean that it may have stayed
aﬂoat for more than 24 hours. However implausible
this may be, it cannot be ruled out from the evidence
that now survives. But in reality a combination of
factors including a slower towing speed, navigational
inaccuracy, and a drifting ship all conspired to create
the positional discrepancy we see today.
HMS Sparrowhawk
HMS Sparrowhawk was an Acasta-class destroyer built
to Admiralty design by Swan-Hunter in 1912. It was
the identical sister ship to HMS Shark which was
also sunk during the Battle of Jutland. The Acasta-
class displaced 1090 tonnes and was 81.5m long and
8.2m wide. The sleek design of British destroyers—the
Germans referred to comparable vessels in the High
Seas Fleet as torpedo boats—is shown in Figure 9. The
20-ship class of Acastas were the ﬁrst British destroyers
to be ﬁtted with all 4-inch gun main armament, with
three guns of this type ﬁtted and a pair of torpedo tubes.
They were capable of at least 29 knots, powered by
twin shafts and turbines, and four Yarrow-type boilers
(March, 1966: 124–132).
At the time of the Battle of Jutland, HMS
Sparrowhawk was part of the Fourth Flotilla, based
at Scapa Flow. It was made up of destroyers and two
large destroyer leaders, HMS Broke (later of the Battle
of the Dover Straits fame) and HMS Tipperary. More
than a quarter of this ﬂotilla was sunk at Jutland.
The sinking of HMS Sparrowhawk
By 23:00 on 31 May, the Fourth Flotilla was screening
the starboardwing at the rear of theBritish battleﬂeet as
it progressed southwards, looking to regain action with
the German ﬂeet at ﬁrst light. At this time the German
line, which had been to the west, crossed eastwards
behind the largely unaware British, but in doing so it ran
into the Fourth Flotilla (McCartney, 2016: 217). The
subsequent series of night actions saw several British
destroyers sunk in the darkness (McCartney, 2016: 216–
237). A summary of Sparrowhawk’s loss is given here.
It was during these confused actions that HMS
Sparrowhawk found itself rammed twice by members of
its own ﬂotilla, ultimately succumbing to the damage
sustained. At around 23:25 the ﬂotilla leader, HMS
Broke, just ahead of HMS Sparrowhawk, sighted the
vague silhouette of a line of ships ahead and made the
British recognition signal. The reply came in the form
of the dazzling searchlights of the German ﬂeet and a
hail of ﬁre. The British returned ﬁre and a torpedo hit
the light cruiser SMS Rostock at this time.
But as the line of British destroyers turned away,
HMS Broke was hit in the bridge by a shell, jamming
the helm. The ship turned full circle and slammed into
the side of HMS Sparrowhawk, just abaft the bridge.
The two ships became locked together and rapidly
slowed. The onrushing destroyers behind tried to avoid
colliding with the two conjoined warships, but HMS
Contest ran into Sparrowhawk’s stern, slicing off several
feet of it, jamming the rudder, and opening the tiller ﬂat
to the sea. HMS Broke was able to get free and limped
northwards out of the battle, heading for Britain, but
Sparrowhawk damaged fore and aft, was now adrift and
only able to turn in circles.
A narrative by survivors of Sparrowhawk’s ordeal at
night was published in 1921 (Fawcett andHooper, 1921:
347–357). Aboard the drifting ship, in the distance
the hapless remains of the burning HMS Tipperary
could be seen, until it sank at around 02:00. Things
looked bad for Sparrowhawk as the streaks of dawn
illuminated the sky. At that time a German light cruiser
emerged from the mist, but then sank much to the relief
of Sparrowhawk’s survivors. This was the light cruiser
SMSElbing,which had collidedwith its own line during
the same action. At around 06:00 a raft of survivors
from Tipperary was picked up and just afterwards the
entire forward section of the ship ahead of where it had
been rammed by HMS Broke fell off, taking the two
ship’s dogs, which were trapped within, to the bottom.
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Figure 9. HMS Sparrowhawk seen from the starboard quarter in 1913. The ship’s long, slim lines are easily discernible
(DS.SWH/5/3/4/2/B173 Tyne and Wear Archives and Museums).
Rescue came sometime thereafter when the destroyer
HMS Marksman, returning home, took Sparrowhawk
in tow, but ultimately had to recover the crew and sink
the ship as the tow had parted in the rising seas and the
fatally wrecked destroyer could not be safely brought
back across the North Sea. Considering what the ship
had been through, it is perhaps surprising that only six
had died.
Prior to the 2015 survey the author carried out
archival research to attempt to establish the possible
areas in which the missing wrecks of Jutland were
located. The details of Sparrowhawk’s movements
subsequent to being disabled were difficult to discern.
No after action report by HMS Marksman could be
traced and it seemed one was not ﬁled after the battle.
Other sources conﬂict in a number of crucial details.
For instance Sparrowhawk’s commanding officer’s post
action report states thatMarksman had come to his aid
around 04:00 (Admiralty, 1920: 321 and TNA 137/302)
but the account given in the 1921 narrative says it was
actually 07:15 (Fawcett and Hooper, 1921: 356). HMS
Marksman’s log seems to support the latter and stated
Sparrowhawkwas sunk at 09:10, but no position is given
(TNA ADM 53/48439).
Ultimately the circumstances of the loss of this ship
were such that it was considered difficult to justify
spending valuable survey time looking for it. This
was primarily because we would be looking for two
halves of the ship, separated by an unknown distance.
Moreover, it could not be satisfactorily ascertained
how far Sparrowhawk may have drifted and in what
direction. At that time the overall accuracy of the
Harper Record had not been tested and its positional
details were not considered reliable.
Discovery and survey
In the weeks after the 2015 survey, the site of a
potential torpedo boat or destroyer was identiﬁed
in the survey dataset. This site, Site A, subsequently
identiﬁed as HMS Sparrowhawk, was brieﬂy inspected
by a team from the Sea War Museum Jutland using
an ROV in July 2015. It looked to be a promising
target but, to confuse matters, another site, Site B,
had been found that also looked like a similar type
of vessel. Both unidentiﬁed wrecks were within a
ten mile radius of the Harper Record’s position for
Sparrowhawk’s loss (Harper, 1927: 110). Moreover,
both site’s multibeam scans showed the types of
dimensions we had come to associate with the German
and British destroyer types in service during the
WW1 period. During the 2016 surveys of March
and August both of these sites were reinvestigated
and HMS Sparrowhawk was ﬁnally identiﬁed
(Fig. 1).
The DTMs of the two wrecks examined in 2016
showed wrecks that are dimensionally consistent with
WW1-era destroyers. Site A looked dispersed in a
similar way to that seen on several other Jutland
destroyer sites (Fig. 10). The wreck at Site B appeared
to be a lot more intact and seemed to have features
suggesting it was of German origin (Fig. 11). This was
conﬁrmed by ROV inspection.
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Figure 10. Multibeam plan view of the wreck of HMS Sparrowhawk (Innes McCartney/Sea War Museum Jutland).
Figure 11. Multibeam plan view of the wreck of an unknown German-built torpedo boat (Innes McCartney/Sea War Museum
Jutland).
Both sites were examined by ROV. The visual
inspection of Site B quickly established that the wreck
could not be HMS Sparrowhawk. It was eliminated
because the wreck was equipped with triple expansion
engines (Fig. 12A and B), whereas Sparrowhawk was
turbine powered (March, 1966: 124–132). Figure 12A
shows the top of the portside engine. It can be seen
that the cylinders are empty and the engine appears
to have been decommissioned, or was being serviced
when the ship sunk. Figure 12B shows the top of
the starboard engine with the cylinder intact with
a circular covering grate in place. This engine looks
as if it was operational at the time of the ship’s
loss.
Further conﬁrmation that the wreck could not
be HMS Sparrowhawk came when the boilers were
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Figure 12. Images from theROV survey of thewreck of theGerman torpedo boat (InnesMcCartney/SeaWarMuseum Jutland).
examined. Figure 12C shows the downcomer pipe seen
at the apex of one of the three boilers present, at
the end of the steam drum. This carried water back
down to both water traps, hence the Y shape. This
feature is not seen on the Yarrow-type boilers ﬁtted to
HMS Sparrowhawk and is generally associated with the
Schulz-Thorneycroft design adopted by the High Seas
Fleet. The curved water tubes seen in image D also
conform to the German type. Yarrow water tubes were
straight (McCartney, 2016: 26).
The ROV inspection of Site A showed features that
conﬁrmed the wreck is to be HMS Sparrowhawk.
The images here are from the 2015 visit to the site
when the underwater visibility was much better than
in 2016. The water traps seen on the boilers are
oval (Fig. 13A), which is consistent with the Yarrow
type (McCartney, 2016: 26). The tubes are straight
(Fig. 13B) and therefore also of Yarrow type. The
turbines, seen from above, had square steam uptakes,
side by side (Fig. 13C). From these steam progressed
to the condensers. A large amount of ammunition was
seen in the stern area (Fig. 13D). It is of British 4-
inch type, as were the brass cordite containers seen on
the wreck. At the extreme north-east of the wreck the
rudder sticks out as the ﬁnal intact part of the wreck
(Fig. 13E). Finally, a chain was seen hanging down to
the seabed (Fig. 13F). There are in fact two present on
the wreck. These may have been part of the towing yoke
used while trying to save Sparrowhawk. The port side
propeller is partially buried in the seabed (Fig. 13F, it is
notched where circled in red).
By a process of elimination this site has to be
HMS Sparrowhawk. The established methodology
of overlaying the class-correct hull plan over the
multibeam DTM (McCartney, 2016: 25) showed an
exact match, proving the wreck was an Acasta-class
destroyer (Fig. 14).No otherAcasta-class destroyer was
lost nearby that has not previously been found.
Identity of the torpedo boat site
With HMS Sparrowhawk positively identiﬁed, the
question turned to the identity of Site B. This was
slightly problematic because all of the German torpedo
boats sunk during the Battle of Jutland have been
found and identiﬁed previously. The last, SMS V4,
was identiﬁed in March 2016 (McCartney, 2017a). It
was fortunate when working in the Jutland battleﬁeld
that no other destroyers were found, otherwise the
challenge of identifying each one would have grown
more difficult. This site had the potential of requiring
revision of the work previously carried out; however,
it is known that all the German torpedo boat losses
during the Battle of Jutland were turbine powered
(McCartney, 2016: 24–25) ruling out this wreck as a
Jutland casualty.
The speciﬁc identity remains difficult to resolve with
certainty. This may be the wreck of a German torpedo-
recovery vessel or similar. It is known that Germany
reused a number of early torpedo boats in a number
of miscellaneous naval roles right through to 1945
(Gro¨ner, 1990: 172–176). These vessels were captured
by theAllies and disposed of in themonths after the end
of WW2, some by dumping at sea. For example, SMS
V156 served as training boat during WW1. Renamed
T156 in 1917, it later served as a torpedo-recovery vessel
in the Reichsmarine and Kriegsmarine. In this case,
wrecksite.eu states that the ship was scuttled 3 May
1945, salvaged, and then sunk again ‘at Jutland’ 10 June
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Figure 13. Images from the ROV survey of the wreck of HMS Sparrowhawk (Innes McCartney/Sea War Museum Jutland).
Figure 14. Multibeam plan view of the wreck of HMS Sparrowhawk with a schematic overlay of the hold layout of the Acasta-
Class of destroyer (Innes McCartney/Sea War Museum Jutland).
1946 (Anon, 2018). It has not been found, but could
potentially be this wreck.
V156was one of the S138-class of torpedo boat. They
were ﬁtted with four boilers of ‘marine type’ (which
usually signiﬁes Schulz-Thorneycroft) and a pair of
triple expansion engines (Gro¨ner, 1990: 172–176). The
engines were laid out in the typical German fashion
of the period, in two separate compartments, with the
port side engine to the rear (McCartney, 2016: 24–25).
The class particulars were checked against the class
drawings and a schematic of the hold layout was made
and overlaid on the DTM of the wreck-site (Fig. 15).
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Figure 15. Multibeam plan view of the wreck of an unknown German-built Torpedo boat with a schematic overlay of the hold
layout of the S138-class of German torpedo boat (Innes McCartney/Sea War Museum Jutland).
The overlay matches in most regards, with the
engines and overall dimensions ﬁtting perfectly.
However, as can be seen on the DTM and on the ROV
tape of the wreck, there are only three boilers present,
with one appearing to be absent from the central boiler
room. So in order for this to be T-156, or similar, some
form of modiﬁcation had to have taken place during
the ship’s life. At present, no information conﬁrming
this has been found. But it is plausible that during its
conversion to a torpedo-recovery vessel a boiler was
removed to make room for a hold, or similar. It is
known that others of the S138-class were modiﬁed to
take three boilers (Gro¨ner, 1990: 173).
So this wreck-site may be a converted pre-WW1
torpedo boat, but its actual identity remains a mystery.
Further evidence supporting it being dumped, or lost
on tow to a breaker, comes in the fact that the wreck-
site showed no signs of it being battle damaged. Nor
were any guns, torpedo tubes, or ammunition seen.
Generally, even on sites that have been salvaged in the
past, ammunition, if present, is readily observed in the
wreckage during surveys, as seen on all of the destroyers
and torpedo boat wrecks in the Jutland battleﬁeld,
including Sparrowhawk.
Concluding remarks
The direction in which a shipwreck points can be
helpful when assessing its potential identity; but it
was not in these cases. Both wrecks are orientated
in a similar direction, with the bows to the south-
east. This was initially problematic when attempting
to identify the wrecks, because Sparrowhawk was
thought to have been in this orientation when it was
sunk, as it is consistent with the north-west track of
HMS Marksman shown by Harper (1919), combined
with the fact that Sparrowhawk was towed from the
stern.
The Sparrowhawk site shows signs of being sunk
while operational. The ammunition seen shows it was
battle-equipped. It was also scuttled by gunﬁre, which
in part may explain the dispersed nature of the wreck-
site. At least one boiler may have exploded, as the steam
drum was not seen at the top of boiler No. 1. This was
also seen on the DTMs and ROV inspections of other
Jutlandwrecks where boilers were witnessed to explode,
such as the case of SMS V27 (McCartney, 2016: 74–
75).
The details of the disposal of German warships after
WW2 by international agreement can be found in the
UKNational Archives (TNAFO 371/50910). The 1945
Tripartite Agreement covers the details of all major
surface units and submarines. Scuttled torpedo boats
were considered ‘Category C’, and of little importance.
V156 is listed as being in Weser area in the American
sector (TNA ADM 116/5564). It is reported to have
been disposed of at sea by the US Navy in June 1946
(TNA ADM 228/28). So V156 may be the wreck, but
this remains a working theory only.
Both wreck-sites show signs of commercial salvage,
consistent to that seen on seven of the other 12
destroyers and torpedo boats sunk during the Battle
of Jutland (McCartney, 2017b). Sparrowhawk’s
condensers, which would have been seen outboard
of the two turbines, have been removed from the
wreck-site (Fig. 14). The conclusion is that at some
point in the past they have been recovered for scrap,
most likely without official permission. The condensers
have been removed from the torpedo-boat site as well,
although it is possible this happened before it was
sunk.
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In summary
The historic narrative of the Battle of Jutland tells that
the two British shipwrecks had similar circumstances
surrounding their loss, but on discovery and survey
the stories behind how they sank turned out to be
different. HMS Warrior seems to have drifted miles
after it was abandoned; far further than even Harper
could have calculated. This may have protected it
from illegal salvors who might have tried to ﬁnd it in
the past. But it will not remain hidden forever and
its future as the last intact Jutland wreck is now in
doubt unless some form of protection is forthcoming.
In this regard, the positional analysis discussed has
been kept deliberately numbers-free. Conversely, HMS
Sparrowhawk was found to have sunk near the Harper
position. This wreck was identiﬁed using both visual
and geophysical methods, as successfully employed on
the other Jutland wreck-sites. This uncovered that its
condensers have been salvaged.
The location and survey of HMSWarrior and HMS
Sparrowhawk draws to a close the long process of
hunting down and recording each shipwreck sunk
during and in the immediate aftermath of the Battle
of Jutland. They are now all known entities and have
at least been recorded visually and with geophysics.
With this article, the results of each case have now
been published. Whereas much more work could be
done on each site to learn more about them and the
circumstances of their sinking from the archaeological
remains, the basic process of mapping the battleﬁeld
and recording what is there is now complete. With this
phase of discovery at Jutland drawing to a close the
question of what should be done with the wrecks must
now be decided.
As has been consistently shown since the surveys
in 2015, the wrecks have been exploited legally and
illegally as economic resources for the valuable metals
they contain (McCartney, 2017b). It is the contention
of this article that only HMS Warrior has been free of
any kind of artefact removal or salvage. It is therefore
the last remaining intact wreck from the greatest naval
battle ever seen in the northern hemisphere. It is
sincerely hoped that this wreck can still be saved from
the criminality so evident on the Jutland wrecks and
elsewhere in the world.
Ratiﬁcation of the 2001 UNESCO Convention by
Britain is desirable in the light of these cases. But any
degree of protection for HMS Warrior and the other
Jutland wrecks that goes further than words requires
action by the British and European maritime security
authorities. The recent innovation of employing satellite
monitoring on shipwreck sites under threat offers the
opportunity to identify suspicious vessels. It is hoped
this technology will be applied to monitor what is left
of the Jutland battleﬁeld before even more is illegally
removed.
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